A sensible reductionist perspective would be something like “objects are completely defined by the states of their components.” The dialogue uses elephants as examples of complex objects, so Rosenberg imagines that we know the state (position and momentum etc.) of every single particle in an elephant. Now we consider another collection of particles, far away, in exactly the same state as the ones in the elephant. Is there any sense in which that new collection is not precisely the same kind of elephant as the original?Physicalist Anti-Reductionism
Most know the "general area" we are talking about, and since Quantum gravity rests on a lot of minds, we have to see methods of materiality as measure in which to express that reality?
The Six Men and the Elephant
So what are the ways in which modern day theorists and scientists detest the insight that such designs are inherent in the very symmetrical views with which all symmetry breaking phases can materialize? Do they?
So I raise the thought of still a elephant in the room:)
"If you constraint the idea of the elephant as a picture of the quantum gravity regime then it is highly likely one would seek to use that elephant in thought experiments to progress such thinking about possible methods to describing that determination within that given environment? How many methods?
One, and only one blind man's description in hand?:) It's still a elephant:)"